On November 4, the European Commission published its annual EU Enlargement Package.

Currently, there are nine official candidate countries for EU membership (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye, Ukraine) and one potential candidate (Kosovo*). Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine and the new geopolitical realities revitalised the enlargement process. Despite being at different stages of progress, according to the European Commission’s enlargement report, most of the candidate countries aspire to finalise the accession negotiations with the Union during this EU electoral cycle, which ends in the summer of 2029.

Enlargement is „the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and one of the Union’s most successful policies” (EP, 2022), thus far having proven its transformative power from Lisbon to Cyprus’ Capo Greco bringing peace, democracy and prosperity.

Although more known for its economic prosperity and high-living standards, EU also ensures security to its citizens and territories. EU's ‘mutual defense’ clause, outlined in Article 42.7 of the Treaty on the European Union, requires member states to provide „aid and assistance by all the means in their power” if another member state is the victim of armed aggression. Hence, as the largest accession country – Ukraine’s high interest to join the Union.

After a decade of ‘enlargement fatigue’, the 2025 package reconfirms that the momentum for enlargement is today a high priority on EU’s agenda.

Mutual engagement and shared responsibility

Enlargement helps improve the quality of people’s lives and incentivizes domestic reform and accountability. It fosters development in all spheres of live, from Fundamentals (cluster 1 - judiciary, rule of law, fundamental rights, and public administration reform), to Internal Market (2), Competitiveness and inclusive growth (3), Green agenda and sustainable connectivity (4), Resources, agriculture and cohesion (5), to External relations (6).

Nevertheless, reform is a two-sided process, contingent on both internal political will and external support.

A recent Eurobarometer poll shows that 56% of EU citizens support enlargement, particularly young and educated Europeans. At the same time, the citizens of the hopeful to join countries also reflect that aspiration (e.g. Moldova’s EU accession referendum and recent parliamentary elections, despite Russia’s hybrid interference).

The Commission recommending to the Council opening all the clusters with Moldova and Ukraine before the end of 2025, (not just the fundamentals, internal market and external relations), gives a clear indication that it also wants to close them (i.e. finalize negotiations) at some point.

All decisions within the EU enlargement framework, including the opening or closing of negotiation chapters, are subject to unanimous adoption by the Council of the European Union, reflecting the collective agreement of its member states. Just as Moldova has Romania as its EU ‘membership champion’, Ukraine has its own ‘EU advocate’ - Poland, but it also does have its ‘membership detractor’ – Hungary.

While the enlargement framework asserts that each country is assessed individually, though a strict, fair and merit-based process, the prevailing regional geopolitical conditions indicate that Moldova’s and Ukraine’s European integration prospects remain closely linked. Moldova decoupling from Ukraine seems improbable, at this stage.

So far, no EU member state opposes Moldova's accession as such, while at least Hungary and the Netherlands have reservations about Ukraine. The Netherlands, which will have a new government after October's elections, blocked the ratification of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine in 2016 through a referendum. In addition, the Baltic States do not support decoupling Moldova from Ukraine, fearing that Ukraine might be indefinitely sidelined and that this could undermine the morale of its soldiers, who serve as the EU’s values frontline defenders.

More regatta than convoy

Moldova has no better alternative for development, economic growth, prosperity and security than EU integration. Moldova „has significantly advanced on its accession path” (e.g. adopted roadmaps on the rule of law, public administration, and the functioning of democratic institutions). The target of completing accession negotiations by 2028 is extremely „ambitious, but achievable”, if the authorities’ commitments to reform are fully implemented and accelerated.

Compared to the enlargement countries, Moldova enjoys several advantages. One of Moldova's major advantages over any other candidate for EU membership is that all the EU legislation (acquis communautaire) has already been translated into Romanian – its official language. This greatly facilitates and accelerates the negotiations. In addition, around one third to nearly half of Moldova’s citizens are already EU citizens. This illustrates familiarity with and respect for EU values, while strengthening the sense of belonging to the European community and enabling citizens to benefit from concrete legal, political, and social rights throughout the Union. Thirdly, the European Parliament will open its Liaison Office in Chișinău on 7 November 2025, in the presence of EP President Roberta Metsola. The third Liaison Office outside the EU, following those in London and Washington, D.C., will support Moldova’s legal harmonization and liaison with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), and will also facilitate engagement with all Eastern Partnership countries.

The Western Balkans benefit of a €6 billion Growth Plan, while through the Ukraine Facility EU provides €50 billion. At the same time, the €1.9 billion Growth and Reform Facility, which Moldova will receive from the EU in 2025-2027, has the potential to double Moldova's economy over the next decade. The EU is Moldova's largest trading partner (representing 54% of its total trade in goods in 2024; 65% for Moldovan exports), the largest investor in Moldova, and the largest provider of financial assistance.

Moldova is already part of SEPA, enabling Moldovan banks to send and receive euro payments to and from other SEPA countries as easily as domestic transfers, without additional fees or complicated procedures. Furthermore, the country will join ‘roam like at home’ programme from 1 January 2026.

Just as in Moldova’s case, the Commission recommends to the Council to open with Ukraine three clusters now (fundamentals, internal market and external relations) and the remaining three by the end of the year, commending the countries’ advancement on key reforms, but demanding an acceleration regarding the rule of law. Nonetheless, in the ravaged country by the war, the pace of reforms is slower than in Moldova and Montenegro, the Commission requiring reinforcement of independence and efficiency of the judiciary, and progress in prosecution, law enforcement and fight against organised crime.

Proving steady political commitment, Montenegro, a NATO member since 2017, has the most chances to finalise first the accession talks with EU by the end of 2026, with an official entry into force expected in 2028. It opened all the 33 negotiating chapters, with seven of the already provisionally closed.

Since October 2024, Albania managed to open 5 out of the 6 clusters, reflecting political commitment. The Commission expects the ongoing momentum to further „accelerate EU-related reforms, especially on media freedom, continued implementation of judicial reforms, further results on the fight against organized crime, illicit drug production and trafficking, and corruption, in particular at high level”. With political audacity, Albania’s Prime-Minister Edvin Rama (since 2013) praises himself with the first ‘AI minister’ – Diella, meant to improving public procurement, which is one of the country’s most vulnerable sectors, and eliminate corruption. The ‘minister’ operating based on foreign (i.e USA) AI models can diminish EU’s digital sovereignty. It recalls about the ambitious but ephemeral governmental councillor to the Romanian Minister of Research, Innovation, and Digitalization – ION. Finally, the College of Europe opened a new campus in Tirana, operating there since September 2024, - a symbol of EU’s commitment to the Western Balkans and recognition of their européanité.

More swift and decisive action is needed from the authorities, before opening the first cluster. To meet the conditions, North Macedonia should strengthen its commitment to the rule of law by ensuring judicial independence and integrity, as well as intensifying efforts to combat corruption. In addition, after changing its official name (Prespa Agreement, 2018), North Macedonia’s EU accession is hindered by bilateral disputes with Bulgaria. It relates to historical interpretation, language, and national identity, which have led Bulgaria to block accession negotiations.  Bulgaria is demanding that North Macedonia recognize and include a Bulgarian minority in its constitution as a prerequisite for accession talks, and considers the Macedonian language as a Bulgarian dialect. 

Despite having opened 22 out of 35 chapters, in Serbia, over the past year, reforms have significantly slowed down, the government’s divisive rhetoric eroding trust in public institutions and their capacity to bring the country closer to the EU. Freedom of expression and assembly significantly deteriorated, in the context of massive protests against corruption and lack of accountability.

Although Türkiye remains a candidate country, the negotiations are halted for almost a decade. Brussels has voiced growing apprehension about democratic backsliding in the country, citing politically motivated prosecutions and restrictions on political pluralism. 

The Enlargement report also assesses the two candidate countries (Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and potential candidate (Kosovo*), with accession negotiations not yet opened.

Instead of rapprochement with the EU, Georgia’s 2025 enlargement report is „the worst ever” – in EU Enlargement Commissioner’s terms, the country becoming a „candidate country in name only”. The internal political dynamic has significantly regressed, without cross-party cooperation and no civic engagement allowed.

An EU candidate country since 2022, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s authorities „must adopt judicial reforms” before it can begin accession talks.

Until Kosovo* gets „back on track of its EU path”, EU Commission’s support remains conditional. It remains contingent upon progress in the normalisation of its relationship with Serbia.

The gradual integration of candidate countries into the Single Market, Single Euro Payments Area, ‘roam like at home’ and other programmes - reinforces their connection with the Union even before they formally join.

Conclusions:

History shows that no candidate country is ever really ready for EU membership. Europe is experiencing a renewed momentum for strategic enlargement — an opportunity that must be seized, not missed. A larger and stronger Union, with Moldova, Ukraine and the Western Balkan countries in it, is a security guarantee for the European citizens.  Achieving a reunified Europe — whole, free, and at peace — requires sustained political will, strategic reforms implementation and shared accountability.

Joining the EU would allow Moldova, Montenegro and others to realise their full democratic and economic potential, while enabling an enlarged EU to strengthen its influence in the world.

Finally, EU enlargement is a regatta, not a convoy. Moreover, while securing the ratification of the accession treaty is a great achievement, European integration remains an ongoing process, even afterwards, progressing through successive dimensions such as entry into the Schengen Area and accession to the Eurozone.

Recommendations:

Accession countries’ governments should remain aware that socio-economic considerations are just as important as the geopolitical considerations are.

The European Union must enhance its absorption capacity to ensure the effective integration of future member states.

The Union’s institutional architecture and decision-making processes should be reformed — extending qualified majority voting to areas such as foreign and security policy and reconsidering the composition of the European Commission and the European Parliament — to enable swift adaptation to the new and evolving geopolitical realities.

The EU’s 2028-2034 Multiannual Financial Framework should foresee allocating adequate financial resources for both pre-accession processes as well as to support the functioning of an enlarged EU.

Future Accession Treaties should incorporate robust mechanisms to safeguard against any regression from the democratic commitments undertaken during the accession negotiations.